Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie characters á 107

read ´ eBook, PDF or Kindle ePUB ↠ Martin Heidegger

read ´ eBook, PDF or Kindle ePUB ↠ Martin Heidegger Ns the ontological difference” Hubert L Dreyfus Times Literary Supplemen. One of my favorite Heidegger lecture courses A solid introduction to Heidegger's thought that touches lightly on Being and Time and the history of metaphisics before beginning the innitial steps towards the leapHeidegger fanboys will understand

summary Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie

Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie characters á 107 À A Choice Outstanding Academic Book of 1982“In Albert Hofstadter’s excellent translation we can listen in as Heidegger clearly and patiently explains the ontological difference” —Hubert L Dreyfus Times Literary Supplement A Choice Outstanding Academic Book of 1982“In Albert Hofstadter’s excel. As a transcript of the lecture course delivered at University of Marburg summer 1927 this book is an important supplement to Martin Heidegger's Being and Time which was then just published First Part Two The Fundamental Ontological uestion of the Meaning of Being in General though unfinished provides an example of going from the revealed horizon of original temporality back to the ontological uestion the meaning of being and further to Dasein's basic comportment As the editor Friedrich Wilhelm von Herrmann says the course of lectures puts into practice the central theme of the third division of part 1 of Being and Time the answer to the fundamental ontological uestion governing the analytic of Dasein namely the uestion of the meaning of being in general by reference to 'time' as the horizon of all understanding of being p 332 As this part never appeared in Being and Time itself this book can be regarded as continuing with the project After all Being and Time already reaches through lengthy investigation on Daseinanalytik and fundamental ontology the point where the constitutive role of temporality is revealed and a retroactive interpretation of Being from this newly achieved horizon is in orderHowever this book does not start from here Instead Heidegger presents an examination of four theses concerning the meaning of being from the history of philosophy1 Kant's thesis that being is not a real predicate the ontological difference between beings and being;2 The medieval doctrine that each to being belongs essentia and existentia the articulation of being into different senses;3 The Cartesian distinction between res extensa and res cogitans the distinction of different modes of being;4 The thesis of logic that being is the copula the underlying general sense of being and its relation to truthThese theses themselves follow an intrinsic order of gradual discovery 1 The ontological difference is the precondition of any genuinely philosophical inuiry 2 But then being shows itself as merely being existentia and being something essentia 3 In terms of the essence of beings and within the horizon of fundamental ontology that gets co disclosed with the first two theses a distinction can be made between things that are merely extant intraworldly res extensa and beings that exist worlding res cogitans transcendence 4 Then despite this distinction it has to be shown that all beings have something in common which is usually grasped by the concept of the copula but actually transcends itThroughout these discussions Heidegger is actually carrying out what he proposed for Part Two of Being and Time namely the destroying of the history of philosophy except that here Heidegger merely deals with topics most relevant to the fundamental uestion of ontology the meaning of beingMethodologically Heidegger in each section first presents the thesis and clears up misunderstanding of terms in it for example the Kantian use of reality Then he argues that traditional approaches to the problem are fruitless because they never asked about the meaning of the being of the beings they appealed to Finally he gives a positive phenomenological account which pays adeuate attention to ontological uestion In this threefold project of destruction reduction constitution the claims of traditional philosophy appear not so much as sheer unexplainable faults than as nice tries as attempts with the right pre conception but failing because the basic ontological concepts were not yet articulated and brought out of confusionA significant theoretical vision that shows itself throughout the book is Heidegger's emphasis on the non theoretical or the comportment of production to be precise For example Kant's claim that being euals position and existence euals absolute position is interpreted as emerging from the experience of positing the material for production in front of Dasein Moreover the material shows resistance in production which implies that it has a being in itself When conceptualized this turns into the sense of being as extantness Vorhandenheit While this develops into the notion of existentia essentia is derived from the form morphe that precedes and prefigures production The emphasis on production practice is in line with the general orientation of Daseinanalytik in Being and Time However production also bears a close relationship with theoretical intuition the former discloses an ideal setting free and letting be themselves that is better fulfilled by the latter; the latter in its functioning erases any trace of the former and retroactively mechanizes it These later developed into Heidegger's view on the relationship between technology and science metaphysicsWith respect to the third thesis Heidegger also shows within the horizon of production that even Kant did not really make the distinction between the extant and the existent For Kant both sides persons and things are finite ie produced beings Not producers of themselves they are leveled down in the sense that they produce effects in one another The whole problematic of discursive knowledge via phenomena as well as of affection stems from this leveling down Everything is absorbed in an encompassing system of mutual influences of the same kind of causality so to speak no matter what kind of distinction is made between different beings This leveling down of beings as produced is the root of modern metaphysics and it renders any distinction concerning the modes of being superficialNow the uestion remains whether upon the theses being phenomenologically clarified it is legitimate for Heidegger to proceed as he intends to the interpretation of the meaning of being within the horizon of temporality For sure in the constitution step of Part One Heidegger concludes that further clarification is impossible without the horizon of temporality But this only necessitates such a horizon without establishing it Conseuently at the beginning of Part Two Heidegger actually has to run another brief introduction to temporality which even borrows here and there from Being and Time directly But then the role of Part One appears unnecessary So is the two parts rather an external combination This uestion can only be solved by decisive evidences For now it suffices to say that intrinsic connections between the two parts have the be found in order for the integrity of the book to be preservedThe brief introduction to temporality leans upon a re interpretation of Aristotle's account of time There the twofold meaning of the now is revealed 1 As existence the now cannot stand on its own but rather exists precisely by means of becoming something else This is what we observe in chronological time Chronos 2 As essence the what of the now remains constant in the sense that it was always already so Kairos Put together the constancy of Kairos gives rise to the variance in ChronosThe temporality that constitutes Dasein's transcendence its comportment towards beings as well as its understanding of being is precisely this constant Kairos It is constant because it is not intratemporal; it is even prior to any prior to the apriori proper From this Dasein's basic orientation towards beings ready to hand as well as its tendency to understand being as extantness gets interpreted with regard to a specific mode of the temporalizing of temporality the praesens As an ecstatic horizon of projection the praesens constitutes the beings thus revealed as well as the understanding of the being of such beings The conseuence is that from ancient Greek philosophy on being is understood as presence ousiaIn this way the ontological foundation of being turns out to be always already undergoing a certain kind of forgetfulness This is not euivalent to a claim on ontic forgetting as if there were a time when ontology was not yet forgotten; rather the forgotten understanding exists in a peculiar temporal mode that of the always already was that which is ontically most proximate yet ontologically most distant Accordingly philosophy cannot intuit with no effort the apriori of being Rather it has to be engaged in an infinite task of repetition Wiederholung and to confront with the risk that whatever it discovers ontologically may during its circulation be leveled down as an ontic claimClose to the end of the book Heidegger also touches upon the notion of selfhood which cannot be too important for understanding his account of authenticity Eigentlichkeit being one's self and inauthenticity not being one's self while pretending to be The common misunderstanding of this account depends on the interpretation of the self as some enclosed realm of immanence out of which one has to reach in order to know transcendent objects or other Daseins To stick to one's self means then to be confined in individuality While Heidegger does speak of individuation this shall not be confused with ready made individuality for individuation is an infinite process of returning to the null basis of Dasein's existence that can never be fully fulfilled More importantly for Heidegger selfhood presupposes Dasein's transcendence because it manifests itself only via reflection ie the co discovery accompanying Dasein's comportment towards worldly beings as a horizon The self no longer serves as it does in Cartesianism as the the starting point of constitution; the certainty assigned to its inner perception reflection in a derivative sense is nullified An isolated self is not even a self In this sense the authenticity of Dasein's existence by no means necessitates its seclusion; indeed such seclusion will never be complete as long as the Dasein remains a selfIt now turns out that given its reuirement of lots of preparatory inuiries the interpretation of the meaning of being within the horizon of temporality can only be carried out each time after a very long introduction which is the case both for this book and for Being and Time It is also clear that at least for Heidegger's approach such an introduction necessarily contains a fundamental examination of the concept of time a factical practice oriented one may say interpretation of Dasein's everyday comportment as opposed to what is dictated traditionally and a manifesto of the genuine task of phenomenology How much length each part takes as well as what ingredients are added where initially the investigation starts from or what partial conclusions it makes particularly differ from work to work though

Martin Heidegger ↠ 7 review

Die Grundprobleme der PhänomenologieLent translation we can listen in as Heidegger clearly and patiently explai. Heidegger clearly wants to sharpen his arguments from ‘BT’ and does just that in this understandable book It’s rare to put the words ‘understandable’ and ‘Heidegger’ in the same sentence but this book is understandable in its own right I would recommend reading ‘BT’ before this one He wants to be understood within these lectures and gets at truth as presence through the unveiling of the present at hand resolved by the ontological difference of the Dasein In ‘BT’ Heidegger doesn’t explicitly make uncovering of the present at hand his standard for truth through the unveiling of the presence He does that in this book Most of what he says in the second half of this book is clearly elaborations of points from ‘BT’ He actually doesn’t uite yet make his ‘turn’ since he still makes ‘care’ as his ontological foundation for Being through a projection to the future weighted by our past through the lens of our expectations in the now Though I only counted him using the word ‘care’ once he could have done it than once but he definitely is not making it foundational in this book and he amplifies most of his other themes from ‘BT’ but stays away from confusing neologisms as he did with ‘BT’ as to not confuse the reader His ‘turn’ is usually said to come about between the first two Volumes and the last two Volumes on his work on Nietzsche and he will replace ‘care’ with ‘will’ in a similar manner as Nietzsche did At least Arendt says that when she cites somebody else who says that in her ‘The Life of the Mind’ and Frynsk says it in ‘Heidegger Thought and Historicity’When other writers write about Heidegger and ‘BT’ they were able to say certain things that just a reading of ‘BT’ would not necessarily make clear to most readers This book fills in those blanks; at least I know it did for me The ‘clearing’ is not flushed out in ‘BT’ the ontological difference is not either; or ousia substance essence and existence; and even the reason why Heidegger uses ‘Dasein’ instead of ‘human’ or ‘man’ is not made explicit within ‘BT’ until one reads this book Also Heidegger really walks away from what Sartre will soon take away from ‘BT’ on the dread of existence or the authenticity of meaning coming from ‘being on to death’ Heidegger will later say he is not an Existentialist I didn’t really want to mention Sartre but I just read his ‘Transcendence of the Ego’ written 10 years after this book and both books could be titled ‘Basic Problems in Phenomenology’ in as much as they both leverage off of Husserl and make Phenomenology a central character in both books Note that Heidegger dedicated ‘BT’ to Husserl and works within Husserl’s constructs for making a science for the philosophy of consciousness with a similar bracketing of the world Husserl will only consider the object itself Heidegger will consider the world outside of the object and he’ll get at Dasein and Dasein will always be ahead of itself from its possibilities and needs to ‘transcend’ itself in order to know itself and usually when it is in its ordinary everyday life it is distracted ambiguously un resolute entangled with the they and not authentic All of that is in ‘BT’ but this book will make that explicit and I’m fairly certain the really good writers of Heidegger’s early thought such as Volume I of Lefebvre’s ‘Critiue of Everyday Life’ from 1947 would have used this book as a guide as much as they would ‘BT’ This book from Heidegger is really a necessary read for students of Heidegger and probably is Heidegger’s easiest to comprehend work if one is familiar with Kant Descartes Plato Aristotle Hobbes Auinas Scotus Kierkegaard Husserl Bergson and the regular cast of other famous Philosophers and who among us aren't familiar with those characters In case for those who need me to complete the thought on Sartre Sartre would say that there is not a transcendental ego beyond the consciousness itself the ego must be the consciousness and that’s it and that intentional state are just another name for conscious states This book will fill in gaps for what others assume one already knows while discussing Heidegger’s ‘BT’ Also I want to note something As Beiner said in ‘Dangerous Minds’ it’s easy to read ‘BT’ and realize that Heidegger was a right wing Hegelian fascistNazi Beiner will say that regarding Division II of ‘BT’ and I would say it was even easy to notice it from Division I and anybody who reads Heidegger’s 1931 ‘Intro to Metaphysics’ 1931 will be able to tell he was a Nazi; this book has no indication whatsoever that Heidegger will soon be a Nazi and he doesn’t have any of his ode to the peasant stuff ala Oswald Spengler’s ‘Decline of the West’ Yes I really hate Spengler the Fascist since he laid the foundation for all fascist to come after him and Heidegger definitely fell under his spell but just not in this book